Europe

Soothsaying

Five Scenarios for a War in Iraq

Thanos Dokos, To Vima (liberal weekly), Athens, Greece, Feb. 9, 2003

An American soldier stationed in Kuwait cleans his gun.

U.S. Army Private Quanell Prothero, from Greenville, SC, cleans his gun with a shaving brush between training exercises at the Chinatown training base near the Kuwait-Iraq border (Photo: Paul J. Richards/AFP).

If we assume that American military action against Iraq will take place in a matter of a few weeks and that Saddam Hussein will not decide to abandon his country or be overthrown in a coup (wishful thinking), what will the war look like? What about the day after? I expect the war to end in U.S. domination, regardless of the obstacles.

The prevailing wisdom among specialists is that military action will begin either by the end of February or the beginning of March. Any further delay may cause problems because of the rising temperatures in the Middle East and because of the financial and political cost of maintaining troops in the region.

Possibly the United States will manage to attain the necessary majority in the U.N. Security Council and avoid a veto from the war’s opponents on that body. This would give the war a stamp of official approval. But there is also the pessimistic scenario, according to which the United States would proceed with the support of a few allies (Britain, Australia, Poland, etc.) but without authorization from the United Nations.

In this case, there would be considerable backlash in the region. This might be sufficiently strong to outweigh the terrifying pressure the United States is able to exert and convince the nearby countries to deny the Americans access to military bases. In the end, all the countries in the region, except perhaps Saudi Arabia, will give in.

The most likely scenario is a repeat of the first phase of Desert Storm: an aerial blitzkrieg but with even greater intensity, accuracy, and firepower this time around. According to American sources, 3,000 “smart” weapons—bombs and rockets—will be used in the first 48 hours of the war, 10 times more than were dropped during the first 48 hours of “Desert Storm.” [We have not verified Dokos’ numbers—WPR]. The United States may already be able to deploy more than 6,700 JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munitions, guided by satellites,] and more than 3,000 laser-guided “smart bombs.”

In 1991, “smart” weapons constituted 9 percent of the ordnance used; today it is expected that 75 percent of the ordnance will be equipped with “smart” guiding technology.

Air strikes will be launched from Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Diego Garcia, as well as from carriers in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Military attacks from the bases in Saudi Arabia are not expected because of opposition from the country’s leadership.

These will likely be supplemented by attacks by U.S. and British Special Forces, who will be positioned within northern Iraq before the full bombardment begins. After the first wave of air raids, U.S. ground troops will be airlifted into key locations within Iraq. Most of these sorties will arrive from the south, but if U.S. forces have enough time to establish bases in southeastern Turkey, some of the missions will arrive from the north.

“Air Intruders”

The troops airlifted in during the early stages of the war will play a significant role. Their tactics can be expected to look something like the aggressive tactics used in the 1989 invasion of Panama but will have a wider and deeper range. There have already been forecasts about the durability of their fuel supplies. In the north, there is also the possibility for limited attacks to be carried out by the Kurds, who are already being trained by the CIA and American commandos. The Kurds will get logistical and air support, in the hope that this will divide Saddam Hussein’s forces.

The last phase of the deployment will include the advance of the heavy infantry from the south. Conventional forces will almost certainly march on Baghdad, while quickly securing the oil fields to prevent Saddam Hussein’s forces from destroying them as they retreat. We also cannot discount the possibility of a smaller attack from the north to take the oil fields in Kirkuk and Mosul and to prevent any possible conflict between Kurdish and Turkish forces. As many as 10,000 Turkish soldiers are rumored to be in northern Iraq already.

The Course of the War

Scenario I, Optimistic:

Iraq’s communications and logistical networks, as well as the bulk of its anti-aircraft defenses, are destroyed within the first 48 hours. The Iraqi air force never manages to take off, regular Iraqi army infantry starts surrendering en masse, and the American forces manage to reach Baghdad within 5-10 days. Once there, things will likely get more complicated: Reports indicate there is a network of underground strongholds in the city and Saddam Hussein’s elite Presidential Guard has a strong presence in the capital.

Scenario II, Optimistic:

After the first 24 hours of intense bombing, the regime collapses, Saddam Hussein is overthrown and a new leadership negotiates a cease-fire with the United States.

Scenario III, Optimistic:

U.S. forces invade Baghdad and, with relatively small losses (military and civilian), conquer the city.

Scenario IV, Pessimistic:

Despite the efforts of the U.S. Air Force and Special Forces, which will have as their first priority the destruction of mobile SCUD missile launchers, Saddam Hussein manages to launch a small number of missiles equipped with chemical or biological warheads. Probable target: Israel. If the number of casualties is relatively small, the United States may convince Israel not to act. If the losses surpass certain limits, Israel will feel obliged to react in order to avoid giving other countries the impression that an Arab regime can get away with attacking Israel with weapons of mass destruction.

The consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, even “tactical” nuclear weapons, against an Iraqi military target are extremely difficult to evaluate. But it seems virtually certain that this would stir enough trouble to disrupt the order of the Arab world and the world at large.

Fortunately, this scenario is less likely than the others. Another less likely scenario has U.S. forces using “tactical” nuclear weapons to destroy underground bunkers containing supplies of chemical or biological weapons.

Scenario V, Pessimistic:

U.S. forces invade Baghdad, the Presidential Guard puts up strong resistance…and street fights last several days with large casualties on both sides, but mostly among Iraqi civilians. This draws international outcry and a strong reaction in American public opinion. There is also the possibility that Saddam Hussein might use chemical weapons, perhaps even against the civilian population, to cause chaos. He could place the blame on the United States and make it even more difficult for the United States to proceed. In any case, the United States will have no choice but to finish what it started, regardless of the damages and consequences.

This article originally appeared on To Vima's Web site.




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Five Scenarios for a War in Iraq

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