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The World
Order and the War on Terrorism
The United
States Is Performing a Balancing Act on a Razor's Edge
Chavdar Kisselinchev, Monitor (nationalist), Sofia, Bulgaria,
Oct. 9, 2001.
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| Men
in downtown Sofia, Bulgaria read a special edition of
Bulgarian newspaper 24 Tchasa on Oct. 8, 2001.
The headlines read 'Kabul Burns' and 'Sofia on Alert'
(Photo: AFP). |
It
has now become a cliché that following the attacks against the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the world is no longer
the same, that it is undergoing a profound transformation in
barely predictable directions. Equally clichéd is the idea that
what is going on will have a fundamental effect on U.S. policy,
international relations, and the course of globalization.
In the aftermath of the U.S.-British air strikes against Afghanistan
we can go even further, and speculate that the changes and rearrangements
on the world stage we are witnessing now are comparable to the
historical breakthroughs that followed World War II. A curious
parallel can be drawn between the Truman Doctrine of 1947, designed
to counteract the spread of communism, and President Bush's
initiative to combat international terrorism and the so-called
"rogue states". The justification for both is a perceived
foreign threat to the United States and the American way of
life.
But are such forecasts justified? Are such radical consequences
to be expected of the United States' Machiavellian maneuvers
and machinations in its attempts to broker an elastic, global
coalition against terrorism and its sponsors?
How long will Bush's unusual war spearhead U.S. strategy in
its foreign relations? Could chronic problems resurface, either
gradually or suddenly, to challenge the vital interests of the
American empire? What of economic recession? What of the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction? What of the conflict over Kashmir,
fought by two countries that only recently developed nuclear
arsenals? What of a possible clash between China and Taiwan?
What of a potential military explosion on the Korean peninsula
or in the Balkans?
It is clear that some states in the Washington-molded coalition—such
as Russia or China—stand to benefit from the emerging order.
Others, such as Pakistan and Israel, could emerge losers. One
way or another, as the United States tries to shore-up an unprecedented
alliance against terrorism, it is walking on a razor's edge.
The U.S. campaign, even in its initial stage, is provoking contrasting
reactions and justifiable misgivings.
Professional optimists on both sides of the Atlantic applaud
the Bush administration's "determination" to abandon
the track of one-man decisions and unilateral actions. Even
the superpower, they argue, has become aware that it needs allies
in order to achieve its goals. But such talk is premature, to
say the least. It may soon turn out that the much-touted "global
alliance" is just a smoke screen and the United States will
try to implement its agenda single-handedly.
Following Vladimir Putin's series of summits with Western leaders
over the past month, the media have proclaimed a new era of
U.S.-Russian relations. In fact, the Americans are not that
interested in Russian reconnaissance concerning Al Qaeda or
in Moscow's support for U.S. efforts to topple the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan.
We can hardly expect that the Kremlin will agree to any significant
American presence in former Central Asian Soviet republics now
ruled by neo-Stalinist dictators. Putin will deftly seek military
and strategic concessions from the Americans and eventual relief
of Russia's heavy debts to Western financial institutions. Putin's
first priority will be to restore Russia's international status
and improve its credit rating. To do this, he will need to convince
the U.S. government to make his priorities Washington's.
The United States must force Israel—its loyal, but increasingly
nervous ally—to coexist in this loose coalition with a
horde of hostile Arab and Islamic countries. Should the U.S.
campaign run upon the rocks, the multifaceted coalition would
fall apart soon after it was assembled. Particularly if the
United States runs into difficulties in its military strikes
on Afghanistan, a surge in Islamic radicalism could destabilize
Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. But Washington's gravest
danger is that the war could destabilize the Arabian Peninsula,
home to the lion's share of the world's petroleum resources.
European politics could also run in unexpected directions. So,
too, could transatlantic relations. Great Britain remains a
staunch U.S. ally, but Germany—because of its special interests
in the East and its still-shaky military self-confidence—is
in a delicate position. And France, which is home to 5 million
Muslims and has close ties to North Africa, is visibly disturbed
by the possibility of a strong Islamic backlash.
Against the backdrop of an overhaul of U.S.-Russian relations,
Europe's familiar dilemmas—the expansion of the European
Union and NATO—gleam with a new light. The war against
terrorism makes the expansion of the European Union seem a more
urgent priority. But the need for tighter immigration controls
will doubtless counterbalance this trend. And at first glance,
the war on terrorism makes the expansion of NATO seem more logical
and easier. But Bulgaria and Romania should not rejoice yet,
for Western governments would rather see the Baltic states [Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia] join NATO before the Balkans. And any enlargement
of NATO would depend on the state of relations between Washington
and Moscow.
London's Financial Times has speculated that should Washington
opt for long-term involvement with the Islamic world, sooner
or later it would need to withdraw its forces from Kosovo and
Bosnia. In that case Balkan extremists may feel encouraged to
take up arms again. 
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