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From the Editor
Foregone Conclusions
A French tanker blast in Yemen. U.S. Marines under fire in Kuwait. And now the massive terror attack in Bali. Forgive me if I’ve missed something. But as I sift through domestic and international press coverage of the Indonesian bombing, I cannot help but marvel at the Bush administration’s mental gymnastics in linking this latest act of terrorism with Iraq.
The carnage in Indonesia has Al-Qaeda written all over it. Nevertheless, George W. Bush, speaking at a political rally the day after the attack, said, “We need to think about Saddam Hussein using Al-Qaeda to do his dirty work, to not leave fingerprints behind.”
Fear clouds the brain. That may explain why, in the face of mounting evidence of a heightened worldwide terrorism threat, the administration continues to rattle sabers at Saddam Hussein. Or at least why the American people and elected officials have yet to formulate a muscular opposition to the Bush foreign policy.
The president and administration members insinuate that they can “connect the dots” from ground zero to Baghdad. Although they have supplied at best flimsy support for that contention, the “what-if” factor apparently holds political sway in the current climate of fear. What if they know something the rest of us do not? How else to understand the U.S. Congress’ cave- in to the White House demand for a resolution endorsing military action against Iraq despite extensive polling data showing that Americans favor a multilateral response to security threats?
In the post-9/11 vernacular, the mere assertion that someone has “connected the dots” carries weight. It connotes the ability to draw a bead on the inchoate profile of an enemy without a national identity, or a central base—or mode—of operation. But what if the dot-connectors have imposed a prefabricated grid rather than finding the genuine causal connections?
In September, the Bush administration published its “National Security Strategy,” standing 60 years of international norms on their head—and leaving much of the world scratching theirs. Arrogating the pre-emption prerogative exclusively to the United States, the Bush doctrine embraces the principle that “as a matter of common sense and self-defense,” America will “act against [such] emerging threats before they are fully formed.” Never mind containment or deterrence; the best defense is a good offense, so let’s neutralize the evildoers between the Tigris and the Euphrates.
As the document states, “Today, the United States enjoys the position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence.” The same week the policy debuted, the president demonstrated how he intends to wield that clout when he gave the United Nations an ultimatum: Support my strategy for dealing with Iraq, or America will go it alone.
Everywhere I go these days, fear prevails. It sits just beneath the surface and percolates to the top in conversations. It colors perceptions of everything from personal and professional responsibility to patriotism to freedom of speech or movement.
While the Bush doctrine was conceived a decade ago, during the first Bush presidency, 9/11 served as midwife to its implementation. Fear-mongering, rather than a vision of global cooperation and U.S. leadership, animates this administration’s pitch to the American and world public. Evoking the specter of the next terrorist attack, Bush justifies a strategy that has unbridled power as its premise, and war without end as its logical extension.
