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Putin’s War

As Vladimir Putin prepared to become Russia’s second elected president after his presumed victory in the March 26 election, the country faced continued turmoil and instability—at least in the short term. Chechnya remained the Kremlin’s number-one problem, but some Russian commentators displayed increasing uneasiness about what kind of president the enigmatic Putin would be.

Although federal troops controlled most of Chechnya, Moscow still had three major problems: foreign condemnation of alleged human-rights abuses by the Russians, an ongoing war against Chechen guerrillas, and the future status of Chechnya.

Grisly video footage aired on German TV, apparently showing a mass grave of mutilated Chechen corpses but dismissed as a fake by the Kremlin, drew a mixed reaction in the Russian press. "The ‘fake’ has a ring of truth to it," wrote Valery Yakov in the reformist Noviye Izvestia (Feb. 29). "Cutting off limbs is not war.... It is a crime, no matter who commits it, a rebel or a federal soldier."

But Yevgeny Krutikov of the liberal Izvestia saw a double standard (Feb. 29). “Russians are used to Western Europeans dismissing or finding plausible excuses for the brutalities committed by Chechen fighters. The way they perceive things fits well into simple and easy-to-sell notions: black and white, cold and hot, Russian savages and Chechen freedom fighters.’’

The ambush of a Russian special forces company, in which 84 soldiers were killed, raised more concerns about holding on to Chechnya. "Every hut and every shrub will shoot at the soldiers who have been left to watch over the victory that has been achieved," wrote Anatoly Kostyukov in the liberal weekly Obshchaya Gazeta (March 9).

Meanwhile, reported Andrei Krasnov in the liberal magazine Kommersant-Vlast (March 7), the Kremlin approved an "interim" plan under which a representative of Moscow will govern the region "only until full stabilization in Chechnya, which is not expected before the end of this year." But Krasnov added that Chechen moderates plan to choose one of their own, whom they hope Putin will name head of the republic. No reaction from the Kremlin, said Krasnov, who concluded, “Only one thing is clear: The political phase of the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya will not be a tranquil one.’’

As Putin approached the election, confident in succeeding Boris Yeltsin, his refusal to disclose any specifics about his future policies  raised the ire of much of the Russian media. Boris Vishnevsky, a political scientist from St. Petersburg—Putin’s hometown—has pointed out Putin’s lack of accomplishments during his six months as prime minister and says he is "dangerously" unpredictable. In the liberal Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Feb. 18), Vishnevsky wrote of the "interpretation of democracy as a national election of a good czar. But the hangover will set in anyway, and it will be very bitter—albeit tardy."

Dmitry Orlov, writing in the liberal weekly Novoye Vremya (March 6), derided Putin’s recently published Open Letter to Russian Voters. “His recipes for breaking into a new dimension are banal.” Putin promises nothing more than “raising living standards, protecting the market from illegal invasions, and a foreign policy based solely on national interests.”

But Aleksei Kiva, one of the nation’s most incisive political scientists, took a more positive view. Kiva argued in Moscow’s Vechernyaya Moskva (Feb. 28) that Putin’s popularity would have soared even without the war in Chechnya: “From the first time he spoke, people perceived him as a leader who would fight to strengthen the state as an institution and a federation, defend the national interests, revive domestic production, and concern himself with the interests of ordinary people.’’

Putin "is not a leftist and not a rightist, but a pragmatist, and one who definitely accepts the values of a market economy and democracy as given,"  Kiva said. Putin understands that the nation’s renaissance can come only from traditional Russian values such as a strong state, patriotism, and spirituality.

Mikhail Margelov offered a similar analysis in the weekly Vek (March 10). "One might hope that the Russian people will finally overcome the inferiority complex attributed to it over the past decade," said Margelov. "Putin is capable of assuring Russians that they can produce goods and sell them no worse than  recognized world masters."

For most Russians, however, the reasons for liking Putin are simple, Aleksandr Golts and Dmitry Pinsker wrote in the liberal newsmagazine Itogi (March 7): "Vladimir Vladimirovich is a new man in power (and healthy and young at that, which looks especially advantageous compared to Yeltsin), plus he is also a decisive, strict, and fair dministrator."

Andrzej Potocki of Warsaw’s Zycie reported a recent encounter he had with two Russians who praised Putin, saying that he would "rule with an iron fist." "And democracy?" Potocki asked. "To hell with that," the Russians replied. "That’s something we’ve never had here."

Putin himself seemed almost playful in holding his policy cards close to the vest. When asked in an interview with Moscow’s financial  Kommersant-Daily whether he would replace "everything and everybody" after the election, Putin replied, "I won’t say!"