Middle East
Middle East
No Justice, No Peace
Working through the final days of his administration, U.S. President Bill Clinton finally saw the clock run out on his efforts to achieve a peace accord between Israelis and Palestinians.
While the mainstream U.S. press conveyed a sense of suspense about the possible outcome of Clinton’s efforts during the weeks leading up to George W. Bush’s inauguration, the failure of the last-ditch peace proposal came as little surprise to Arab commentators. Much of the Arab press took a jaundiced view of the latest plan, dismissing it as yet another example of the Clinton administration’s blatant pro-Israeli bias.
An editorial in Egypt’s semi-official Al-Ahram (Jan. 10) noted that the failure of Clinton’s plan was predictable, because it fell short of the minimum requirements for a just and lasting peace. Despite the president’s good intentions, “At their heart, Clinton’s proposals are essentially Israeli proposals in substance and aim,” the editorialist wrote. “They could only fail.”
While the Clinton proposal would have brought about an independent Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank, the editorialist continued, the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes within Israel—the issue at the heart of the conflict—would be denied. Moreover, the Clinton framework would allow large Israeli settlement blocs to remain in Palestinian territory and perpetuate an Israeli military presence in Palestinian land in the Jordan Valley.
The plan’s vagueness on the issue of Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem was also worrying, according to the newspaper. “Therefore, it was natural for Israel to announce its acceptance of the Clinton plan, as it was natural that the Palestinians registered 26 objections to the American proposal.”
Expressing similar sentiments about Clinton’s proposal and his Mideast peacemaking legacy, an editorial in the London-based Palestinian expatriate Al-Quds al-Arabi (Jan. 9) concluded that Clinton’s approach to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was deeply flawed in its accommodation of Israeli positions. “Perhaps Clinton was well intentioned and may have sincerely sought to close the chapter of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” the editorialist wrote, but he “relied on the Israeli gateway and entrusted the keys of his regional diplomacy to a bunch of pro-Israeli zealots,” such as his peace envoy Dennis Ross.
Like the Camp David negotiations of 2000, the Al-Quds editorialist continued, Clinton’s last proposal was built on a strategy of coercive bargaining: exploiting Pales tinian weakness through U.S. and Israeli strength. “But the latest Intifada turned the tables on everyone and foiled all American-Israeli plans,” contended Al-Quds al-Arabi.
The tight deadline prescribed by Clinton’s last push for peace provoked cynicism among Arab commentators, who said the U.S. leader was more concerned with securing his legacy than in attaining a fair deal. Columnist Jihad al-Khazan of the Saudi-owned pan-Arab Al-Hayat of London (Jan. 10) commented, “Clinton wants the Palestinians to abandon their national rights...in order to enable him to make a triumphal exit from the White House and win the Nobel Peace Prize, and make the world forget about the Monica Lewinsky scandal.”
Some Arab analysts concluded that the shortcomings of the Clinton administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict underscore the urgency of finding more objective mediators. Columnist Muhammad Kharroub of Jordan’s Al-Rai (Jan. 9) described Clinton’s elev-enth-hour plan as “a sedative capsule filled with poisons,” the latest evidence that the United States is anything but the honest broker it says it strives to be.
Clinton’s proposals “show clearly that Washington is not qualified to play the role of sole
sponsor of the peace process. And the time may now be ripe for the Palestini ans and Arabs to go to the U.N. Security Council, leaving Washington to do what it likes, whether during Clinton’s last days or the first days of the Bush administration,” Kharroub wrote.
