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From the
March 2002 issue of
World Press Review
(VOL. 49, No. 3)
Tensions
Between India and Pakistan
India: Raising the Stakes
Shishir
Gupta, India Today (centrist weekly newsmagazine), New
Delhi, India, Jan. 7, 2002
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| India's
oldest paramilitary forces, the Assam Rifles, march in
the Republic Day Parade in New Delhi, Jan. 26, 2002. India's
annual Republic Day was shorn of the traditional show
of military might as the country's troops, tanks, and
guns remained on the Pakistani border (Photo: AFP). |
No war is inevitable,
it is said, until it breaks out. Even as war clouds loomed large
over the Indian subcontinent and Mumbais hyperactive satta
market [betting parlors] gave no money to those who bet that
hostilities would break out between India and Pakistan, there
was a pause in the warmongering last week. It was a much-needed
halt as Indias diplomatic offensive began to pay some
dividends.
As the two countries mobilized their offensive army formations,
including medium-range missiles, tanks, and artillery, along
the border, the United States, alarmed by the rapid deterioration
of the situation, moved to reduce the tension. In its toughest
talking yet on the attack on the Indian Parliament, U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell said America had decided to designate
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) as foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs) and issued a stern warning to
Pakistan to rein them in, or else. The decision among other
things empowers the U.S. president to use all necessary
means including military force to destroy the infrastructure
of the organizations and isolate countries which provide support
to them.
Powell put it more diplomatically when he said: The United
States looks forward to working with the governments of India
and Pakistan to shut these groups down. The U.S. move
also rejected Pakistans long-held view that these outfits
are involved in a freedom struggle in Jammu and
Kashmir.
With America declaring whose side it is going to be on in the
second round of the war on terrorism, Pakistan suddenly found
the will to act against the groups. But India has been less
than satisfied with the little it has done: frozen the assets
of the two organizations and reportedly arrested JeM leader
Maulana Masood Azhar. India is concerned that these two outfits
have merely changed their names, shifted their headquarters
to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and handed the leadership
mantle to PoK-based Kashmiri fundamentalists. External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh was unusually blunt in his choice of
words: Pakistan is playing a joke. Its police arrested
Maulana Masood Azhars brother instead of the terrorist.
Now the Punjab Police says that it cannot find Azhar.
Delhi would like Islamabad to demonstrate action against these
jihadi groups on the ground. That includes a visible clampdown
on recruitment of volunteers by these organizations, dismantling
their training camps, and taking joint steps with the Indian
army to put an end to infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir. India
is also seeking details from Pakistan on how many accounts of
the LeT and JeM Islamabad has frozen and the transactions carried
out by these outfits.
India wants the two countries to jointly assess the significance
of the action taken by Pakistan on the LeT and JeM. Since 1989,
Delhi has given Pakistan evidence to show these terrorist groups
were involved in the violence against India and the linkages
these jihadis have with the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence.
It has already shared evidence on the involvement of the LeT
and JeM in the attack on Parliament with the United States,
U.K., France, Britain, Russia, and prominent Arab world countries.
The proof principally comprises a recording of the telephone
call made by the attackers to Karachi before the attack on Parliament
and a message appearing on the LeT Web site saying no group
should claim responsibility for the incident. So far Delhi is
still working on linking the attack on Parliament with the Pakistani
establishment.
Other diplomatic options that Delhi intends exploring are withdrawal
of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status from Pakistan, and,
as a final move, abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.
The diplomatic establishment here is apparently opposing moves
on MFN status and the Indus Treaty. They feel that these steps
would be counterproductive in the long run and would harm India
more than Pakistan.
Meanwhile, if the diplomatic offensive runs its course without
much effect, India has indicated that it is ready for war. In
perhaps the largest military mobilization since the 1971 Indo-Pak
conflict, the Indian army has mined areas on the Punjab and
Rajasthan borders and moved the short-range missile Prithvi
to its operational locations. While the western fleet of the
Indian navy has proceeded to its operational locations, its
war plans are being fine-tuned to avoid U.S. aircraft carriers
and warships that are still operating in the north Arabian Sea.
The air force is already on high alert and has moved its air
assets to Punjab and Rajasthan. There is no reason to
doubt Indias military preparedness, says former
Western Army Commander Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has mobilized its defensive corps
along its eastern borders and the Line of Control and deployed
short- and medium-range Hatf I and II missiles. It has deployed
the entire 60,000 troop-strong I Strike Corpscomprising
two infantry divisions, one armored division, an independent
armored brigade, and an artillery divisionalong the Jhelum-Chenab
corridor. However, its Army Reserve South (ARS), essentially
the Multan-based II Strike Corps, has still not crossed the
Chenab River. It has an option of crossing the Chenab and moving
north, east, or south. While movement toward the north would
mean an attack on Punjab, mobilization toward the east and south
would mean danger on the Rajasthan and Gujarat borders, respectively.
That the situation has reached the brink is indicated by the
Indian government communicating last week the W
signal, or warning, to the armed forces for full mobilization
for war.
Diplomacy may be war by other means. Now even that option appears
to be running out. The next step is declaring a D-day. Peacemakers
are hoping it is not an inevitable step.
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