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From the
February 2002 issue of
World Press Review
(VOL. 49, No. 2)
Baghdad
in the Cross Hairs
A Question of Time
Al-Quds
al-Arabi (Palestinian expatriate), London, England, Nov.
30, 2001
The question is
no longer whether an attack [on Iraq] is a possibility or not,
but rather when it will take place. There is much evidence to
confirm this hypothesis:
First: [U.S. Secretary of State Colin] Powell confirmed that
President George Bush’s threatening statements against
Iraq—offering the option of a return of international inspectors
or face further sanctions—were serious and that they needed
no further clarification. Second: British Prime Minister Tony
Blair announced yesterday that the war against Afghanistan was
the first stage. He offered his support to President Bush—who
had sounded him out on the return of international inspectors—in
whatever position the United States takes toward Iraq. Third:
The Turkish National Defense Minister [Sabahattin Cakmakoglu]
said his country’s opposition to hitting Iraq was amenable
to change depending on how the situation develops. This statement
can be interpreted as a Turkish message to the U.S. administration;
all depends on the price Turkey can obtain in exchange. Fourth:
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon revealed that the U.S. administration
would notify his government in the event the United States decides
to carry out an attack against Iraq. He said: “I know with
certainty that I will not be surprised in the event an attack
happens.”
The question then is whether the Arab countries, and especially
those that are friendly with Washington, can prevent an attack
before it happens. The answer is negative, of course, because
most Arab governments have become powerless and submissive,
fearing the American press writing about their dictatorships
or the spread of corruption amongst their top and lesser officials.
More dangerous is that some governments, especially in Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, welcome any attack on Iraq on the condition
that it topple its system, and that the attacker be ready to
cover all the costs of such an operation. The presence of the
Iraqi regime and its resistance to every form of American and
Arab pressure is embarrassing to those governments. For they
cannot and will not lift the economic sanctions in the shadow
of the present regime. They feel profoundly embarrassed by the
enforcement of those sanctions and the resulting deaths of at
least a million Iraqis.
Previous experience has shown that the Arabs lose shamefully
in any first war. But they learn their lesson from defeat, and
their performance improves the second time around. With the
June War [1967] came the disgraceful naksa [or setback,
the name given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to Egypt’s
defeat in the Six-Day War against Israel—WPR] and
ensuing disaster for the Nasser regime.
Yet he was able to stand on his own feet and wage a successful
war of attrition against the Hebrew state and to rebuild the
Egyptian army on the basis of another operation. This was the
same rebuilding process completed by President Anwar Sadat,
turning to wage a war that was closer to victory, on the tenth
of Ramadan in the year 1973 [the Yom Kippur War]. The situation
in Iraq is different: Iraq faces the hostility of the greatest
power in the world. The element of surprise this time will be
absent. Any new confrontation will be final for the Iraqi regime.
Therefore, it is not to be expected that the war will be without
casualties, especially on the American side.
As for Arab casualties, they will be limitless. The war will
be catastrophic, perhaps changing the map of the region in its
entirety. The change of regimes will not be limited to Iraq
alone. 
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